Critical Realism and Social Sciences

Critical Realism and Social Sciences

Introduction
Ruben in Craig (2008) proposes that to understand philosophy of social science, there are perhaps four distinct ways which are all complementary. First, one might approach the philosophy of the social sciences historically by studying major schools or philosophers of an earlier period. Another possible way is through the study of the issues and problems that these writers, and their contemporary counterparts, address. A third way is to study of either contemporary movements and schools of philosophy, or specific philosophers, who bring a specific slant to the sub discipline. Finally, studying the philosophical problems that arise specifically within each of the social sciences.
In this project, what I am going to do is to trace and then critically analyze post-positivism, as one of the approaches in philosophy of social sciences in relation to its epistemological perspectives as to how this approach has continuously influenced the scientific traditions in the past and present. I am especially interested to see how critical realism affects the sciences particularly social sciences and how their works impact on social praxis.
I chose critical realism as the topic of discussion on this project for two reasons. Firstly, it is about the fundamental concept of revealing scientific truth proposed by critical realism as a school of thought under the umbrella of post-positivism. What I emphasize is the idea of relating truth with the reality. For example, when I am writing about classroom literacy, I could not convince readers if I do not clearly conceptualize what the nature of the classroom phenomenon is about; why such literacy problem happen; and how this problem occur.
Secondly, the critical realism framework provides a better solution to the social phenomena which are pervasive today. Its framework is aimed at addressing questions which relate to actual phenomena that occur in the society and attempting to find a closer solution to such unsolved social matters by giving recommendations to policy makers. This means that the results of the study are not merely rhetorical discourses without purposes. Instead, this can become a media of transforming such discourses to social praxis. For example, the educational research is not just for a short purpose to fulfil research requirements like to see how a particular strategy works on a particular circumstance or a classroom and thereby the research is merely consumed by a small group(researchers and practitioners).It is beyond than that of shorthand needs.
In the first part of the discussion I present an overview of post-positivism and its epistemological tradition. Here ,I begin with short elaboration of the role of philosophy of social sciences in solving social matters. I also deal with the basic tenet of post-positivism in general. The next section is about the demarcation of scientific, pseudo-scientific, and everyday knowledge. In this section, I try to highlight the idea of falsification which is used to demarcate between scientific; pseudo-scientific; and non scientific knowledge. As the central discussion of this essay, the critical realism framework is broadly elaborated on, especially how this school of thought evolves in the scientific traditions. Finally, I also discuss how critical realism as a school of thought is applicable to the social researches.

Post-positivism and its Epistemological Tradition
Philosophy of social science in its attempts to understand and explain human beings and its phenomena in a scientific methodology needs a particular approach to address questions. The purpose of addressing questions applying the scientific approach is to distinguish knowledge resulted from this mode of inquiry from everyday knowledge. Klee (1997) states that the main feature which distinguishes science from other modes of knowledge gathering is the use it makes of observational experimentation. He further claimed that what you found out in this mode of knowledge, to be more exact, should result from a skilful combination of doing and thinking.
Some prevailing questions in social science appear in relation to the unsolved social matters for which centuries might hardly be answered even in today’s scientific traditions. However, the questions are absolutely important; at least to remind us about how to deal with them and the most important thing is to come up with scientifically acceptable ideas to arrive at close solutions. For example, Why does society need social science?; What is the current understanding of social science?; And what is the public role of social science? (Delanty & Strydom, 2003: 5).
The extending debates especially on the role of social science in a way to understand social realities in a scientific way were pervasive. This means that the matter encountered by human beings in their everyday lives cannot be resolved by methodology or philosophical reflections on epistemology alone; above all it is the question of the public role of social science (Delanty & Strydom, 2003:5)
Post-positivism, also usually called a school of post-empiricism is a meta-theoretical stance following positivism. One of the most influential supporters of this school of thought was Karl Popper. His stance was very much clear in opposition to positivism and logical positivism school of thoughts. He also recognized most of the criticisms addressed to positivism especially concerning its scientific methodology. His position was also clearly seen as a critical stance upon the misconception of positivism itself.
The post-positivism paradigm emerged as a response to the fall in popularity of positivism at the end of the World War II. Unlike the positivists who claimed the truth of objects is the substance of their positive transcendence (Holmwood, 2001), the main tenets of this paradigm are that the knower and known cannot be separated, and the absence of the shared, single reality (Phillips and Burbules, 2000). From post-positivists’ perspective, the theory was understood to occur by ’reconstructing’ rather than ’accumulating’ truth (Holmwood, 2001). Post-positivists believed that human knowledge was not based on unchallengeable, rock-solid foundations; rather it was conjectural, but the post-positivists thought that they did have real grounds, or warrants, for asserting their beliefs or conjectures, although these warrants could be modified or withdrawn in the light of further investigation (Phillips and Burbulles, 2000).
This view is in line with what Popper has previously proposed that knowledge is objective. It means that being embodied in various substrates, it is not reducible to that what humans individually ‘know’ . And therefore the ‘truth’ is objective in a sense of being real and having qualities. Consequently, it is not reducible to whatever one prefers ’the truth to be’ (Popper, 1969). Popper also viewed ’criticism’ as all that can be done when attempting to differentiate claim to knowledge.

The Demarcation of Scientific, Pseudo Scientific, and Everyday Knowledge
As an influential figure who strongly criticized positivism, in particular logical positivism, Popper did not abandon all aspects of positivism (Delanty and Strydom, 2003). What he did, was to refute that as a methodology of science, positivism in its inductive empiricist form was unable to explain the principle rejection of evidence. The central thesis of his critical rationalism in the philosophy of science is that the principle of verification must be replaced by the principle of falsification.
Here, to draw on how scientific knowledge, pseudo scientific knowledge, and everyday knowledge are different, it is presented an illustrative example of the refutation of theory which once was theorized by Adler and Freud. “that of a man who pushes a child into the water with the intention of drowning it; and that of a man who sacrifices his life in attempt to save the child”. Each of these according to Popper (1969: p.35) can be explained with equal ease in Freudian and Adlerian terms. To Freud, the first man suffered from repression while the second man had achieved sublimation. According to Adler, the first man suffered from inferiority. That’s why he wanted to prove that he dared to commit some crime. And so was the second man whose need to prove himself that he dared to rescue the child. It was precisely this fact - that they always fitted; that they always confirmed - which in the eyes of the admirers constitute the strongest argument in favour of these theories (Popper, 1969).
From the example presented, it can be inferred that to arrive at a scientific statement, refutability is certainly required. In other words, since the statements addressed to the men presented above are two competing statements in a sense both of them could be equally at ease. Popper explained that this would be hardly accepted as scientific truth. That’s why Popper deems psycho-analysis to be pseudo-science because it can provide an account for every type of observed behaviour, and thus is not amenable to refutation (Silva, 2007).
Related to this problem, Popper (1969: p.37) views the importance of the criteria of scientific status in a theory such as falsifiability, refutability, and testability. According to him, the problem which he tried to solve by proposing the criterion of falsifiability was neither a problem of meaningfulness or significance, nor a problem of truth or acceptability. It was the problem of drawing a line between the statements or statements systems of the empirical sciences, and all other statements - whether they are of a religious or of a metaphysical character, or simply pseudo-scientific (Popper, 1969: p.39). Later, Popper called this as a problem of demarcation and posited the criterion of falsifiability as a solution, for it was said that statements or systems of statements in order to be ranked as scientific must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations (Popper, 1969: p.39).
In contrast, Kuhn (cited in Holmwood, 2001) argues against Popper’s falsifiability criterion, claiming that scientific theories do not seem to offer themselves for critical tests and ‘anomalies’ are frequently explained away by adhere modifications rather than being allowed to falsify the theories in which they arise. In addition, Kuhn (1962) argues that falsifiability is inadequate to falsify whether a statement could be scientifically accepted after it was falsified through observations or series of observations since the paradigm which is supposed to help compare is under one paradigm. Therefore, falsifiability is unhelpful to understand why and how science has developed as it has. To Kuhn, in the scientific practice, it is only possible for a theory after falsification accepted as a new science if a credible alternative theory which can be used to compare the former is available.
Nevertheless, Kuhn (1962) asserts that in principle, only three types of phenomena about which a new theory might be developed. The first are phenomena which have been well elaborated by existing paradigm, however, these phenomena rarely provide either motive or point of departure for theory construction. The second class of phenomena are those whose nature is indicated by existing paradigms. However, its details can only be understood through further theory articulation. The third type of phenomena, that is, the recognised anomalies whose characteristic feature is their unreasonable refusal to be assimilated to existing paradigm. This usually happens when the articulation of theory fails to be done. On the basis of Kuhn’s concept of theory development, Blunden (1998) infers that in principle, a new theory does not have to conflict with any of its predecessors; a new phenomenon might emerge without reflecting destructively upon any part of past scientific practices; and again, the new theory might be simply a higher level theory than those known before.

Scientific Framework of Critical Realism
Trochim (2008) proposes that one of the most common forms of post-positivism is a philosophy called critical realism. He said that a critical realist believed that there was a reality independent of our thinking about it and that science could study. Similarly, Bhaskar (1998) states that critical realism splits the world ontologically into three levels; the real, the actual, and the empirical. The real refers to whatever exists whether or not we can perceive or understand it. For example, the concept of God, people may associate it with what they believe but they will never be able to make it real. The only way to realize His existence is to perceive and understand His creations in every respect. Sayer (2000) believes objects that have structures and powers reside, no matter whether we can see or not.
The actual relates to what happens when the powers of the real are activated (Bhaskar, 1998). He said that the concept of identity can demonstrate the difference. We all possess the latent physical and mental capacity to claim an identity (the real) but when we do we adopt a certain way of speaking, dressing and interacting (the actual) (Jonas, 2008). For example, Indian people, in reality, though have been settling in the UK for more than three decades or even those who were born in England still firmly maintain their Indian identity. Most of them still speak their mother tongue (India) when they meet their Indian fellows, though culturally in some ways it is inevitably influenced by western culture (British), such as dressing or interacting. Similarly, most of middle eastern people insistently hold their identity on the basis of their belief (Islam) when they come to other countries like in the UK. One of the attempts to maintain their identity is to build mosque where they pray.
The empirical refers to a domain of experience which can refer to either real or actual. This is something to do with theory and practice. It is an active and a reflexive engagement in which we seek to achieve what we think rationally as well as reasonably good and worth for us either economically or psychologically. Our action - either good or bad - is indicated by the inner truth or pulse of things and the spot from which we must act (Bhaskar, 1993). This is in contrast with a subjectivist who would hold that there is no external reality (Trochim, 2008). We are each making this all up, claim subjectivists. In short, critical realism refers to any position that maintains that there exists an objectively knowable. It is a mind-independent reality whilst acknowledging the roles of perception and cognition.
The post-positivist critical realist believes that the goal of science is to hold steadfastly to the goal of getting it right about reality, even though we can never achieve that goal. Because measurement is fallible, the post-positivist emphasizes the importance of multiple measures and observations, each of which may possess different types of error, and the need to use triangulation across these multiple error sources to try to get a better bead on what’s happening in reality (Trochim, 2008).
The post- positivists also believe that all observations are theory-laden and that scientists are inherently biased by their cultural experiences, world views, and so on (Trochim, 2008). For example, Popper proposed an illustration in relation to universality use such as ‘glass’ and ‘water’ in a sentence “Here is a glass of water”. This sentence, argued Popper, necessarily yielded transcend experience since in describing glass and water there were innumerable tendencies to behave in innumerable ways under various conditions (Hempel, cited in Fetzer, 2001). In other words, suppose the glass was mistakenly for water but contained alcohol whereas you expected it to water plants; to quench your thirst; or to extinguish fire. That’s why post-positivism rejects the relativist’s idea of the incommensurability of different perspective, the idea that we can never understand each other because we come from different experiences and cultures.

Critical Realism and Social Research Methodology
The ideas surrounding modernity, epistemology, quantitative and qualitative methods and grounded theory are something important to understand key issues for post-positivist research which entails discourse, power, narrative and reflexivity.
As one of the school of thoughts after the downturn of the positivism, critical realism is understood to have made indispensable contributions to the current scientific tradition especially in the philosophy of social sciences. Sayer (2000) claims that critical realism is able to bridge the gap between positivist material conceptions of reality, hermeneutic, and social constructionist version. It is also claimed to be able to explain effectively the duality of agency and structure in the social world (Jonas, 2008). Jonas illustrated the relationships of the agency and the structure in the social world in terms of social capital and ethnic identity in a case study of a Latin American Carnival in London. He saw that the social capital and the identity were two things which could not be isolated. He demonstrated that isolating social capital and ethnic identity would not be viable as both were in part constituted by environmental factors. This viewpoint is supported by Sayer (2000) that critical realism emphasizes on the notion that social systems are open to context and therefore cannot be isolated. Jonas (2008) asserts that the combination of agency and structure is central to critical realism. Any intentional action necessarily required social structures and therefore they must pre-exist these actions, claimed Jonas.
Though it is described differently, Ryan (2008) pointed out that post-positivist research principles emphasised meaning and the creation of new knowledge, and were able to support committed social movements, that is, movements that aspired to change the world and contributed towards social justice. In line with this view, Holmwood (2001) states that science continued, for the most part to be seen as progressive and successful in the sense of generating new extensions, new insights, and new explanatory resources. As Bhaskar (cited in Pratschke, 2003) insisted on the possibility of choosing rationally between rival theories linking with the concept of ‘explanatory power’ arguing that the most powerful theories were those that explained the widest range of phenomena. Although generative mechanism, frequently refer to unobservable entities and processes, critical realists argued that the explanatory adequacy of our hypotheses about these mechanisms can be observed by investigating their observable effects (Pratschke, 2003). Social researches are expected to provide meaningful contributions to equality regardless social economic status. The struggle for meaning, and the construction of new meanings and knowledge are emphasized. Ryan (2008) demonstrates that the concept of discourse shows how the fixing of meaning is never a neutral act, but always privileges certain interests.
Feminism and its movement was one of the signs where we could see social structures. The feminist movement was basically triggered by an inequality treatment which had long lasted in western civilization especially where capitalism took place as a powerful economic system. Sayer (2000) reminds us the questions that have been debated in sociology concerning with whether capitalism and patriarchy consist of one or two interacting systems; and whether it was necessarily patriarchal or just contingently so; whether bureaucratic organization gendered or just contingently so; and whether such institutions together with market are neutral with respect to identities. According to Sayer (2000), these were not academic, instead of considerable practical questions; indeed political significance and therefore, the answers may be different in ranges and possibilities in practice. This implied that if capitalism in fact gendered in a sense that in a practical level there was a subordination of women compared to men, there should be progress taken up to end this situation. In other words, capitalism as an economic system must be replaced by another radical system. He also argued that the market in capitalism was not as neutral as it had to be towards women.
Sayer (2000) also argues that his critique of the feminist research is concerned with wider issues in the nature of social inquiry. It means that he tried to defend the realist ontology for social inquiry where social structures were understood in relation to causal powers. To understand the causal powers in a pure form needs a comprehensive understanding of other structures that exist there which in normal operation are not quite clear. What he criticized in the feminist research was the form of analysis significant to empirical associations or regularities according pervasiveness rather than according to the necessity which was resistant to abstraction in social sciences. This viewpoint is in line with what Popper has previously stated in relation to falsifiability that it was not a matter of how many ‘white swans’ the researchers have observed ’white’ but the possibility of finding other than ‘white swans’; that is, a black swan tended to happen. Kitcher (cited in Pratschke, 2003) argue that realists can rely on our everyday methods for correcting our perceptions of the world around us, taking the success of our physical, physiological, and psychological theories to reveal the limitations of our perceptual powers. In this position, I strongly agree that there is innate perceptual power boundary in human beings which in every respect limits our ability to make accurate judgments. Therefore, the judgements we make on this basis are of course, fallible.
Another example that what we can clearly see today especially in the global economic situation is the collapse of the giant companies like Wall Street and Dow Jones. The sudden fall of these companies is not simply a matter of the downturn of the global situation in business but it is more beyond than that of what people generally assume. It has something to do with discourses in the political and power level. In this case the role of media is very crucial. It can influence people’s perspectives about real situations. In these circumstances, discourse is responsible for this sort of reality and not a mere reflection of it. Thus, the question of what discourses prevail and whose interests they serve are most important (Weedon, 1987: 11). He further argued that this was not to discount the importance of material issues, economics or law, but to emphasised the equal importance of culture and discursive power. The production of knowledge is political and has real effects.
The following characteristics of post-positivist critical realist research in general are presented. Firstly, research is broad rather than specialised – lots of different things qualify as research. For example, realist social scientists do not ask questions about regularities but explore the necessary preconditions for a mechanism to function and the qualities of the real objects that enable them to act as they do (Sayer, 2000).
Secondly, theory and practice cannot be kept separate. We cannot afford to ignore theory for the sake of ‘just the facts’. What this accounts for is that the connection of theory and practice is a necessity. The facts alone are not adequate to picture the truth unless they are supported by the basic principles of how to come to truth. Bhaskar (1993) points out in his third level of development which he calls 3L (three level of development) that the inner truth and the spot from which people must act is based on motifs of totality, reflexivity, concrete universality (subjectivity and objectivity), autonomy, reason and rationality, practical wisdom and the unity of theory and practice.
Finally, the researcher’s motivations for and commitment to research are central and crucial to the enterprise (Schratz and Walker, 1995: pp. 1-2). It has been stated above that motifs of totality is one of the keys to allow for the success of the research. It has something to do with the reasons why the researcher is interested or motivated to conduct research. The idea that research is concerned only with correct techniques for collecting and categorising information is now inadequate (Schratz and Walker, 1995: 3). Basically, correct and rigorous technique for collecting information is important. However, to achieve a high convincing research quality, rigorous technique alone is not enough. Fischer (1998) examine that social sciences have no apparent significant impact on public issues. Rather, it has been absorbed in contemporary political discourse in the sense that its role is more to stimulate the political processes of policy deliberation than to provide answers or solutions to the problems facing modern society. Therefore, it is suggested that building continuing research dimension into the work of research is a necessary (Schratz and Walker, 1995: p.3) .The aim of this is to lead to new ways of thinking; new possibilities for actions; and sometimes a new sense of direction.

Conclusion
Based on the illustrations about the critical realism school of thought, I come to conclude that essentially there are at least three stand points which underlie their concepts of pursuing knowledge. First, knowledge - either scientific or everyday knowledge - is tentative in its existence. The nature of knowledge is uncertain and imperfect. In other words, it is likely to have changes and that is why it is provisional. Since then, falsification was claimed as a necessary issue in scientific knowledge (Sayer,1984). He also argued that one of the flaws of the ideal type was a built-in protection from refutation.
Second, the progress in science is in general a result of trial and error approach. Social praxis is an adequate fact to claim that science generally deals with problems people in general pervasively encounter. In fact, in many ways it does not necessarily work for a number of reasons - especially in social sciences where human being are always subjects of research. People keep changing and are dynamic both in thoughts and actions; beliefs as transcendental features of any form of social life; political power; economic pressures; and so forth. The competing fight of real and actual is plainly seen. Therefore, building continuing research dimension into the work of research is a necessary action. Finally, there is no single empirical research value-free. Therefore, the possibility to be bias is absolutely high. Last but not least, essentially, science and philosophy should be concerned with human liberation.








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Author:
Ruslin Tendri
D.Phil in Educational Studies
University of Sussex
Brighton United Kingdom